West Reading, PA — A devastating explosion at the R.M. Palmer Company candy factory on March 24, which resulted in the deaths of seven employees and injuries to ten others, was caused by a natural gas leak, a National Transportation Safety Board report concluded. The explosion, which occurred just before 5 p.m., also displaced three families and caused significant damage to both the factory and surrounding properties, with an estimated $42 million in property damages.
According to the detailed 110-page report released Tuesday, the leaked gas originated from a UGI Corporation-owned pipeline. The gas accumulated in the basement of Building 2 of the candy manufacturing facility before igniting, leading to the catastrophic event. Furthermore, the explosion severely damaged another factory building and a nearby apartment complex.
The report identified multiple safety concerns, including the degradation of a retired service tee, inadequate threat assessments on pipeline integrity, and the risk of unmarked private pipeline assets crossing public areas. The NTSB also noted that the evacuation of Building 2 was delayed despite the detection of natural gas.
Further investigations revealed that in 2021, a UGI crew retired and capped off an Aldyl A polyethylene service tee installed in 1982, but inadvertently left it connected to the natural gas distribution system. Over time, degradation exacerbated by high temperatures from a nearby defective steam pipe allowed the gas to seep into Building 2, funneling through chocolate pipe conduits and subsequently causing the explosion.
The probe shed light on the absence of natural gas detection alarms in commercial settings, the insufficient accessibility of gas distribution line valves, and a lack of clear and effective natural gas safety messaging reaching the public. These findings point to a broader issue of safety protocol adherence and infrastructure management within the industry.
Operators may have been unaware of the locations of plastic natural gas assets, and UGI lacked the necessary procedures and training for crews to identify and report sources of elevated temperatures near these assets. Additionally, UGI was found to have insufficient inspection protocols for its valves, leading to delays in shutting off gas to the affected area.
The report critiqued UGI’s Distribution Integrity Management Program (DIMP), stating it failed to prevent the accident due to inadequate threat information and ineffective evaluation of risks concerning the integrity of plastic piping in elevated temperature environments.
While some factory employees detected the smell of gas before the explosion, only a few evacuated the premises. Prior to the incident, R.M. Palmer Company had incorporated natural gas emergency procedures and training, yet the NTSB found that employees might not have fully understood the risks or had adequate emergency response training.
In response to the findings, the NTSB released a suite of resources and facts about natural gas alarms, aiming to enhance public awareness and encourage preventive measures to avert similar disasters in the future.
The R.M. Palmer Company and UGI Corporation are now faced with the task of implementing the recommendations from the NTSB report and addressing the infrastructural deficiencies identified, in hopes of preventing future tragedies and ensuring the safety of both their employees and the broader community.